The lightweight computational nodes being used in WSN pose particular challenge for many security applications. This paper investigates a number of security techniques and novel implementations appropriate for WSN nodes, including various tradeoffs such as implementation complexity, power dissipation, security flexibility and scalability.
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSN) are widely used by diverse communication systems [5] . However, WSN are constrained by limited resources which include limited communication range and limited energy. Furthermore, the lightweight computational nodes that are deployed in WSN create challenges for many current security applications. This paper investigates a new security technique and suitable implementation for WSN, including various trade-offs such as implementation complexity, power dissipation [2] , security flexibility and scalability. This enhanced security application is aimed at developing a network that has efficient and flexible key distribution scheme secured enough to prevent algorithmic complexity and denial of service attacks while conserving energy [3] . A reevaluation of Blom's key generation was implemented [4] . The aim was to provide a secured pre-allocation and distribution of keys by every single node in WSS with a piece of data that would be generating a pairwise key with every other node in the network as shown in Fig.1 ; implemented in Contiki operating system due to its advantages of multi threading. The resultant pairwise key generated with a piece of data was then used for generating an AES-encrypted pairwise key with every other node in the network. The novelty of this research includes:
(a) A key allocation and Key Pre-distribution smart security technique to secure Base station and the sensor nodes before deployment. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:
The next section presents the related works by researchers in this field, followed by a description of the geometrical solution of key management scheme in Section 3. Section 4 describes the implementation of the enhanced security in Contiki OS.
Section 5 showcases the implementation in real sensor motes and compares the solution achieved. Finally, section 6 draws the conclusion. Moreover, Wireless sensor network facilitates many other numerous application areas for instance, tactical observation by military unattended sensor networks, elderly and patient monitoring by body area networks (BANs) and by building automation and control networks (BACnets) [6] .
Researchers are still concerned if WSN can actually be secured considering that messages can be intercepted based on what was sent, whom it was sent to, when the message was sent and where the message was sent from and to [3] . They are also considering the level of integrity of the system in terms of the actions of the intruders to insert, delete and/or change the message that was sent. How accurate the final information will be with consideration of denial of service is currently being investigated. Therefore, improvements in the latest electronic technology has also brought about the idea of deploying small, low power, low-cost sensor devices in the Oil and Gas Industries. Various security issues that have received consideration in ad hoc networks [7, 8] are not applicable to WSN due to architectural disparity between these two types of networks [5] . Also, quite a number of other security schemes are already being proposed. If the cluster formation design by [9] currently being investigated is found to be effective in saving energy, there is need to look at the security between the individual nodes, neighbouring nodes and the base station. Moreover, the majority of current security applications proposed is not viable due to low memory to run complicated algorithm after running the Operating System (OS) and other applications. This is due to the fact that all security services are assured by cryptography; therefore, security in WSN will amount to a sizeable amount of energy consumption due to cryptographic functions [5] .
Many WSN deployments are security sensitive and attacks against them may lead to damage to health and safety of people. Denial of service creates conditions for hardware failures, resource exhaustion, bugs, malicious attacks and environmental conditions that could reduce the functionality or totally eliminating a networks ability to perform as expected [10] . It has been argued by Wood and Stankovic [13] that the possible security attack on the network layer is due to neglect, greed, homing, misdirection, authorisation, probing, blackholes and monitoring. Further research and more detailed study by Karlof and Wagner [15] put specific names and methodologies to these attacks. These network attacks are classified as follows: a) Spoofing, replaying or altering clustering messages: This is the most direct attack in the network. A malicious node by spoofing, altering or replaying routing information in the network can mount a DoS attack by making itself part of the routing formation and then creating routing loops, attracting or repelling traffic, generating false error messages, shortening or extending source routes or partitioning the network [10] . It can also select the forward packets to reduce the probability of detection. One method to combat the threat is by authentication and antireplay protection. Another technique is by multipath routing. The multipath routing sends the same data over multiple paths to give it a higher probability of reaching its destination [13] .
3

Geometrical Solutions for Key Management Scheme
Blom proposed a key generation system that is symmetric and allows nodes to generate a pairwise secret key with a secured communication among the uncompromised nodes.. This is the reason for using Blom's pairwise key predistribution idea in the WSS base station to construct (λ+1) × N matrix G over finite field GF(q). Although, Blom's scheme does not propose how G matrix should be generated, the only requirement is that its columns must be linearly independent in order to achieve the λ-secure property. 
Along with G matrix the base station also generates random symmetric matrix over a finite field () GF q but unlike G matrix, the D matrix is kept secret and must not be disclosed to any sensor node or adversary in the wireless sensor network at any time.
(3)
The D matrix must be generated all at once and it has to be stored in the base station the entire lifespan of the network. is matrix that is the result of computation where is transpose of (DG). Each row of a matrix is disclosed the one sensor in the wireless sensor network in order to allow the node to generate its pairwise key with other sensors.
In practice, since the base station does not preserve the entire G matrix, a row of A
A is generated from the column of G matrix c G at a time when a sensor is connecting to the network as follows:
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is then disclosed to the node where it is used for computation of pairwise keys.
Therefore,
Since K is a N x N symmetric matrix, therefore if node n would get n : th row from K and wish to communicate with node m it will just take the m : th column of the n : th row and use the value as the pairwise key, since K is symmetrical, therefore ,, m n n m KK  (8)
K is therefore a symmetric matrix. This means that where is an element of K on i-th row and j-th column.
, ji K is used as a pairwise key between nodes i and j .
In practice when node i wants to communicate with node j , it sends the During implementation, it was discovered that the scheme will not be effective with the original idea due to the following reasons: We would have to store information for every single node. We would have to know the exact number nodes in the network. When adding a new node we would have to update information on every single node. Therefore instead of storing n:th row of the K matrix we should store n:th of the A = (DG) T matrix. That gives us (λ+1) columns on every single node. When two nodes want to communicate, they will first exchange their seeds S N where S is a primitive element of GF(q) and n is the number of nodes in the network, therefore the K generated becomes:
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That gives us sufficient scalability so we can add new nodes without breaking down the running network. The base station keeps a counter of number of nodes in the network and when a new node n wants to join the network, the base station increments the counter, generates a column of G for the node n
Therefore, the base station keeps track only of the matrix seed S n where n is the number of currently connecting node and generates column G c for the node. The base station also sends the seed S N and the n : th row of A to the node n. The node n is now ready for distribution. 
Therefore we must calculate set of 16 A matrices. Let s be the secure property (λ + 1) 
Now, we have to provide each node with a matrix P composed of rows from each of the A matrices. Let represents matrix P composed of rows of 16 A matrices provided to node i .
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A A A be the set of generated A matrices and P K be the column provided to AES as a encryption key, then:
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This paper proposes a number of techniques for Enhanced Security Implementation as follows:
Description of the proposed method through example
For the implementation of the proposed enhanced security mechanism, Micaz motes were used along with Contiki operating system [8] . Micaz has a radio frequency range between 2400MHz to 2483.5MHz with maximum data rate of 250kbps. They receive and transmit power at 19.7mA and 17.4mA respectively.
Micaz uses DSSS-O-QPSK modulation with a receive sensitivity of -94dBm. The outdoor range is between 75m to 100m and operates with multichannel advantage.
Given that most of the nodes have a limited energy supply, the transceiver therefore functions as a tolerable balance between data rate and energy consumption [9] . Micaz uses a micro controller with a clock frequency of 7.37
MHz. Random access memory (RAM) is 4KB and ROM 128KB. It was originally connected with TinyOS as the operating system. But in this paper the TinyOS was replaced with Contiki OS. All these features make Micaz an appropriate research platform suitable for this experiment. Contiki is a lightweight operational system developed for constrained platform, such as sensor nodes. Its basic configuration fits in less than 2 KiB of RAM and 40 KiB of ROM, and provides two communication stacks (µIP [10] and Rime [11] ) as well as multi threading functionalities. All its modules, drivers and user application are implemented in C programming. While Although TinyOS is generally used but Contiki has a much easier learning curve for the developer and researchers, because it is based on a widely known programming language.
Fig. 2 Typical wireless sensor network set up
Key Allocation: K keys in the Base station using unicast implements a mechanism whereby new nodes can be added without breaking down the network, giving sufficient scalability. The method involves sending a request to the Base station.
When base station receives a unicast request, it generates a key and sends it to the node. When node receives the key, it stops to unicast to the base station and start to unicast to all its neighbours.
Key Pre-distribution: Easy deployment of security key algorithm implements the deployment of the generated k pairwise key from the Base station. When base station receives a unicast request, it generates key and sends it to the node. When node receives the key, it stops to unicast to the base station and start to unicast to its entire neighbours. The first thing that happens is that it will request a unicast seed. When the node receives a seed request: it unicast its seed to the sender.
When sender receives the seed, it says something like "Sending message to node
x.y using pairwise key k". When the node receives a message it says something like "Received message from x.y, using pairwise key k". This system is an efficient security key algorithm method for pre-distribution.
Mesh preallocation, routing and set-up stage for encryption intelligently implements Mesh pre-allocation routing mechanism. The code implements pairwise key preallocation, routing, and when communication is initialized, first the sender sends it's pairwise key seed to the receiver. The receiver responds with its pairwise key seed and then the sender sends the message. The seeds are used for initiating encryption using AES. The mesh module sends packets using multihop routing to a specified receiver in the network using the Rime communication stack [11] .
Encrypting the Pairwise Key with AES-Advanced encryption Standard: key management is a security mechanism, an added version to make the network further secured. It implements a modification to advanced encryption standard and improves the performance of AES, thereby accommodating the key management system with low memory capability and energy consumption. The new modification was implemented in Cooja simulator [12] . 16 bytes encryption was also generated to concur with the standard of AES needed for the encryption and decryption. 
Fig. 7 Node Placements in the Network
Also, the following screenshots as shown in Figure 8 illustrates the visibility of each node in the wireless sensor network.
Fig. 8 Node Placement Simulations
Performance
The table below shows speeds of single-hop and multi-hop communication for key pre-distribution and communication phase for both uIP and Rime protocols. Rime's mesh connection by default, it automatically allows pre-allocation phase on multi-hop and further steps are needed to forbid this behaviour.
Conclusions
Without a clear perspective of the risk involved in WSS and options available to manage the risks by intruders, it is infeasible to have a defensible network.
Therefore, developing a security protocol can be quite challenging. The enhanced security application for WSS if properly implemented can bring total significant change to the scope of wireless sensor networks and increase its usefulness. Faster clustering routing algorithm with TCP/IP integration is also under consideration.
